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Introduction
Exchange rates have been central to the course of economic development in Latin
America for decades.  From the heyday of import substitution in the 1960s to the rapid
expansion of foreign debt in the 1970s, from the debt crisis and its troubled aftermath in
the 1980s to the rekindling of growth and borrowing in the 1990s, the exchange rate has
been crucial to the mix of government policies that has shaped the region.  Indeed, many
analysts regard exchange rate policy as a major determinant of other economic outcomes,
such as adjustment to the oil shocks of the 1970s and the debt crisis of the 1980s (Sachs,
1985).  And currency policies have themselves been at the center of some of the region’s
most prominent economic processes and events, such as liberalizing reforms in the
Southern Cone between 1976 and 1982, the Mexican crises of 1982 and 1994,
Argentina’s adoption of a currency board in 1991, Brazil’s 1999 currency crisis, and
ongoing discussions of dollarization.
It is thus surprising that there exists very little analysis of the political economy
determinants of Latin American governments’ policies toward their exchange rates.  The
fact that currency policy is made by governments, and governments operate in a political
environment, is recognized by all, yet a political economy of exchange rate policy is
barely in its infancy.  There are no generally accepted theories that explain why
governments choose the currency policies they do, and no developed body of empirical
work that shows the relationship of economic and political factors in the determination of
currency policy.  This situation is in striking contrast to the state of the art in the study of
trade policy.  Scholars have long worked with well-developed theories of the
distributional implications of different trade policies,
1 and more recent work has focused
on how electoral and other political institutions affect the making of trade policy.
2
                                                       
1 Indeed, there is a proliferation of such theories—the Heckscher-Ohlin/Stolper-Samuelson approach, the
specific-factors or Ricardo-Viner view, and more recent perspectives emphasizing imperfect competition—
so that one of the principal questions in the field is which theory is in fact most accurate in predicting the
distributional impact of trade policy.
2 Lohmann and O’Halloran (1994), Rogowski (1987), and Persson and Tabellini (2000).4
In an initial attempt to fill the previous void in the economic literature, this paper
summarizes a series of studies, undertaken as part of a larger project sponsored by the
Inter-American Development Bank, on the role of political economy factors in the
making of exchange rate policy. While these factors are, of course, examined in
conjunction with economic and macroeconomic variables, they have previously received
little attention in their own.  These political economy factors most notably include the
role of interest groups, electoral competition, and election timing. This paper presents
some simple analytical arguments, then summarizes evidence contained in other papers in
this project.
Analyzing the Political Economy of Exchange Rates
Despite the great economic importance of exchange rate policy, there is virtually no
literature on its political economy.  The contrast with trade policy is especially striking:
economists and political scientists have carried out rigorous analyses of the political
economy of trade for over sixty years, and the large body of work on the subject has
given rise to some more or less generally accepted principles.  Analysts of trade policy
typically agree on the trade-offs facing policymakers, between the  distributional and
welfare effects of protection; there are powerful (if contending) theories about the
distributional impact of different trade policies; there are well-developed models of the
interaction of  distributional, electoral, institutional, and other factors; and there is a
wealth of empirical studies evaluating these approaches.  Nothing like this exists for the
study of the making of exchange rate policy.
This paper presents a more or less consensual view, drawn from the small extant
literature, about the crucial building blocks of a political economy of exchange rate
policy: the trade-offs faced by governments, and the  distributional, macroeconomic,
institutional, and other socio-economic factors that affect the choices policymakers make
as they confront these trade-offs.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive survey, but to
help motivate the empirical studies that follow.
3
                                                       
3 The principal entries in this literature include Bernhard and Leblang (1999), Clark and Reichert (1998),
Collins (1996), Edison and Melvin (1990), Edwards (1996), Eichengreen (1995), Frieden (1994), Hefeker
(1996), and Klein and Marion (1996).5
The principal thing the studies in this project are trying to explain is exchange rate
policy, meaning both government decisions about the exchange rate regime and decisions
about its level.  The regime decision involves choosing the degree to which the currency
is allowed to float freely or be fixed against some other currency.  There is a wide
spectrum of such regime choices, ranging from a completely free float through a variety
of managed floats, to degrees of fixity ranging from a target zone to a peg, to a currency
board or dollarization.  A focus on policies toward the level of the exchange rate is bound
to raise eyebrows among economists, but theory and experience indicate that nominal
exchange rate movements can have substantial real effects on relative prices, and that
governments can and do affect their real exchange rates—within limits, of course.
Although the regime and level decisions are closely linked, they can be thought of
separately for purposes of analysis. In making these choices, policymakers have to
consider the costs and benefits of their actions, the trade-offs they confront.
With regard to the exchange rate regime, the principal trade-off faced by
exchange rate policymakers is between  stability  and  flexibility.  Governments value
monetary stability of two sorts.  The most direct impact of the exchange rate regime is on
currency stability, which is of value inasmuch as predictable exchange rates reduce the
risk attached to cross-border economic activity.
4 All else equal, governments would
prefer stable exchange rates, which tend to be associated with fixed regimes.  Fixed
exchange rates can also lead to  monetary stability, i.e., low inflation, through two
different channels: a fixed rate makes it difficult for  tradables prices to rise without
drawing in competing imports, and the choice of a fixed rate can serve as a visible signal
of government intentions, as policymakers tie their own hands as a commitment device.
Yet this domestic and international monetary stability can only be attained at the
cost of giving up national policy flexibility.  A fixed currency regime makes it
impossible, without abandoning parity, to use the exchange rate as a policy instrument;
and it also makes it difficult or impossible to use interest rates for macroeconomic policy
purposes (the difficulty varies with the degree of capital mobility).  This has two related
implications for policymakers.  First, it reduces their maneuvering room for dealing with
                                                       
4  Certainly economic agents can hedge against these risks, but this possibility is especially limited in small
developing countries in which forward markets are often underdeveloped.6
macroeconomic distress: they cannot devalue in the face of payments deficits, or lower
interest rates in a recession.  Second, it reduces their ability to respond to distributional
pressures for supportive policy: the government cannot devalue to satisfy complaints
from import  competers or exporters about foreign competition by devaluing, and it
cannot lower interest rates to appease debtors. Obviously, this is not necessarily a bad
thing. In fact, policymakers may want to tie their own hands, removing inflation from the
list of things for which voters can blame them. However, this also means that they cannot
use exchange rate policy to satisfy their constituents, which may be politically costly.
There is an analogous set of trade-offs for the level of the exchange rate.  A
weaker real exchange rate stimulates demand for local tradable products, whether in
home or foreign markets.  It can therefore help reduce trade and payment deficits, and
invigorate the tradable sectors of the economy; and for exporters it has the direct effect of
raising the local-currency earnings derived from foreign sales.  On the other hand, a
weaker real exchange rate reduces national purchasing power, making consumers worse
off.  Both stimulating local manufacturing, agricultural, and raw materials sectors, and
increasing local purchasing power, are desirable goals; but with regard to the level of the
exchange rate, they are mutually exclusive.  The benefit of increasing the
“competitiveness” of national producers comes at the cost of reducing the real income of
national consumers, and vice versa.
There are, then, two sets of trade-offs. With regard to the regime (fixed or
floating), there is the trade-off between monetary stability or credibility versus monetary
flexibility. With regard to the level (depreciated or appreciated), there is the trade-off
between competitiveness and purchasing power.  An even simpler setup could collapse
the two into a choice between “credibility” and “competitiveness,” i.e., between a fixed
currency with strong anti-inflationary effects but no ability to affect relative prices, and a
more flexible currency with a tendency to depreciate in order to maintain local price
competitiveness.  Either way, if governments could have all these things, they would, but
they must weigh the costs and benefits of the various choices.  The ways in which they
weigh these choices will depend on the structure of the national economy, and on the
character of the domestic political economy.  A simple summary of how these factors
might influence policy choice follows.7
Economic Structure
An economy with a greater need for an independent monetary policy, and a greater
ability to pursue one, should be more likely to choose a floating rate.  As indicated by the
long-standing literature on optimal currency areas, this implies that economies subjected
to exogenous shocks uncorrelated with those faced by potential anchor countries, and
with little mobility of factors between themselves and potential anchor countries, will be
more likely to float.  By the same token, extremely open economies will be more likely to
fix, for two reasons.  First, highly open economies typically find the exchange rate less
effective as a policy tool—the real impact of a nominal depreciation, for example, is
rapidly eroded as import prices rise and are transmitted through the economy.  Second, a
very large proportion of economic agents in such economies are sensitive to exchange
rate risk and will be sympathetic to attempts to reduce it.  Empirical evidence indicates
that these last considerations are especially relevant at very high levels of openness,
typical of the small European countries or the small nations of the Caribbean basin, for
which total trade is often in excess of 100 percent of GDP.
Macroeconomic Conditions
Countries with long and persistent histories of high inflation are especially likely to be
tempted to use a fixed exchange rate to bring inflation down.  However, this desire will
be tempered by the fact that fixing the currency in conditions of high inflation typically
leads to a real appreciation with undesirable effects on both tradables producers and the
balance of payments.  So the anti-inflationary advantages of a fixed exchange rate have to
be weighed against the disadvantages of a transitional real appreciation.  These last
disadvantages may be moderated by a high degree of indexation, or by great wage and
price flexibility, either of which substantially reduces the likelihood of a real
appreciation.  If, as has been the case in many Latin American hyperinflations, wages,
prices, and contracts are indexed to the dollar, fixing against the dollar is unlikely to
cause a substantial real appreciation.  And since indexation tends to rise as inflation rises,
typically becoming close to full in conditions of hyperinflation, it can be hypothesized
that in conditions of hyperinflation the anti-inflationary motives predominate over
concern about a real appreciation.  Conversely, when inflation is moderate, the desire to8
avoid a real appreciation tends to outweigh the desire to bring inflation down, given the
typically limited nature of  indexation in these conditions. This would give the
relationship between inflation and exchange rate regime choice a U shape, with fixed
rates most likely to be adopted in conditions of very low and extremely high inflation.
Interest Groups
The exchange rate has powerful effects on relative prices, and thus on the interests of
different groups.  An appreciated currency raises the relative price of nontradables, while
a depreciated currency raises the relative price of tradables, so preferences over the level
of the real exchange rate are clear.  With regard to the regime, tradables producers are
likely to oppose a fixed rate, for two reasons.  First, as already discussed, the adoption of
a fixed rate in conditions of high inflation, such as has characterized much of Latin
America, usually leads to a transitional real appreciation, with detrimental effects on
tradables producers; this is the common experience of most exchange rate-based
stabilization programs.  Second, a fixed rate eliminates the possibility of a depreciation to
maintain or restore the competitiveness of  tradables producers.
5  Because  tradables
producers are often involved in cross-border transactions, they may also be concerned
with the volatility that a floating rate can bring. They may thus prefer a regime such as a
backward-looking crawling peg, which tends to both reduce volatility and maintain the
competitiveness of the real exchange rate.  The most prominent supporters of a fixed rate
are likely to be those heavily committed to cross-border contracts that involve an
intertemporal dimension, particularly in countries, such as many in Latin America, where
forward markets are limited.  These would typically include the commercial and financial
sectors, and foreign-currency debtors.  The clearest predictions from interest-group
approaches, then, are that on distributional grounds  tradables producers will prefer a
depreciated, floating rate, while those heavily engaged in cross-border activities, such as
finance, commerce, and foreign debtors, will prefer a fixed rate.
                                                       
5 To be sure, it also eliminates the possibility of a nominal appreciation that would favor nontradables
producers; but this is quite rare.  The asymmetry, while of theoretical interest, is virtually universal and can
simply be assumed to hold.9
Political Institutions
A fixed exchange rate requires that the government respond to exogenous shocks with
domestic adjustment measures and rules out the use of active exchange rate policy or
monetary policy to stimulate the national economy. It also requires that fiscal policy be
under control.  On both dimensions, relatively weak governments will be unlikely to be
able to sustain a fixed rate: they will be less able to resist the fiscal demands of sectoral
and other groups, as they will lack the political support necessary to impose adjustment.
In addition, they may have strong motives to use the exchange rate to improve short-term
macroeconomic conditions. Thus minority or coalition governments, divided
governments, and other governments in a weak political position may be less likely to opt
for a fixed rate. The same could be applied to political regimes more generally:
dictatorships and other authoritarian regimes are likely to be better able to undertake the
adjustment measures necessary to maintain a fixed rate.
Electoral Considerations
There are a number of reasons why elections may have an effect on exchange rate policy.
The income effect associated with a depreciation reduces the purchasing power of the
population. This can make depreciation unpopular, and therefore politicians may want to
avoid them at election time. Devaluations may also be unpopular because they generate
inflation.
6  One specific possibility is that governments may be tempted to launch
exchange rate based stabilization programs during the period prior to an election. In
addition to reducing inflation, these stabilization programs tend to generate an economic
boom in the short run, followed by a recession later on.
7 In high-inflation economies, the
combination of inflation reduction and economic boom may be appealing as an election
                                                       
6  Stein and Streb (1998) have developed a model in which devaluation acts as an inflation tax, and
governments differ with regards to their competence. In their model, competence is associated to the
capacity of the incumbent to deliver a given bundle of public goods with less tax resources. Under an
imperfect information setting, governments reduce the rate of devaluation (and thus the inflation tax rate) in
the run-up to elections, in order to convey a signal about their competence and increase their chances of
reelection.
7 See, for example, Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), and Calvo and Végh (1991).10
approaches.
8  These arguments point in the same direction: the rate of depreciation may
be expected to decline prior to elections, and to accelerate once elections have taken
place. In terms of the real exchange rate, a government facing elections may be expected
to attempt to effect a real appreciation, perhaps by lagging (or fixing) the nominal
exchange rate behind inflation, with an inevitable real depreciation to follow.
These, then, are the expectations regarding the analysis of the political economy
of exchange rates in Latin America.  The studies in the IDB project subject the issue to
close empirical investigation in the context of these analytical expectations. The next
section summarizes some of their findings.
The Political Economy of Exchange Rates in Latin America in Practice
The five countries studied in depth in this project (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and
Peru) have gone through highly varied exchange rate experiences on several dimensions.
While some countries have experienced very few changes in their exchange rate regime
during the period under study, others have gone through a variety of regimes, in some
cases repeatedly. While some countries have shown great concern regarding the level of
the exchange rate for competitiveness purposes, others have generally given more
importance to macroeconomic stability in designing exchange rate policies. In several
cases, the emphasis of exchange rate policy has swayed from macroeconomic stability to
competitiveness and back, depending on external conditions, as well as on economic and
political developments in the country.
                                                       
8  Stein and Streb (1998) discuss several examples of ERBS launched in the run-up to elections, and some
of the country studies in this volume provide additional examples of this practice.  Bonomo and Terra, in
their chapter on Brazil in this volume, present an analytical framework in which politicians have a loss
function defined in terms of the current account and inflation but place different weights on these two
objectives. Thus, they tend to cater to two different groups in the population: workers, who place more
weight on the inflation objective, and tradable producers, who care primarily about competitiveness.
However, as elections approach, and in the presence of unobserved shocks, even those that favor the
tradable sector have incentives to appear driven by inflation concerns,  rather than competitiveness
concerns, as workers outnumber tradable producers and can define the result of the election.11
This diversity of experiences, naturally, leads to different methodological choices
in trying to learn about the political economy determinants of exchange rate policy. In
some cases, such as those of Chile (De  Gregorio, 1999) and Peru (Pascó-Font and
Ghezzi, 1998) in which the exchange rate regime has undergone numerous changes over
time, explaining the choice of regime (in addition to the level) becomes an interesting
experiment. In these two studies, as well as in the cross-national study (Frieden, Ghezzi
and Stein, 2000), different models of qualitative dependent variables are used to study the
political economy determinants of exchange rate regimes. In other cases, in which the
regime has been constant for prolonged periods, it is more productive to focus not on the
regime but rather on the exchange rate outcomes, such as the level of the real exchange
rate or the degree of misalignment from notional equilibrium levels. This is the case in
Brazil and in Colombia, both of which have been on backward-looking crawling peg
regimes for most of the time since 1967. The Argentine study takes a somewhat different
methodological route, using various time series techniques in order to emphasize the
change in the relevant trade-offs underlying exchange rate policy, which it characterizes
as a shift from the politics of redistribution during the ISI period toward the politics of
inflation.
Credibility vs. Competitiveness and Other Trade-Offs
The trade-off between the competitiveness objective (achieved through a depreciated real
exchange rate) and the macroeconomic stability objective (achieved through a fixed
nominal and/or appreciating real exchange rate) for exchange rate policy takes center
stage in all of the studies in this project. In many instances, the nature of the trade-off,
and the choices made along this trade-off have changed over time. The Chilean study, for
example, highlights shifts between a pro-competitiveness stance and an anti-inflationary
stance.  This was illustrated by the shift toward inflation-fighting as the crawling peg was
replaced by fixed exchange rates in 1979, only to go back to a pro-competitiveness stance
(and a crawling peg regime) after the 1982 crisis.
The conflict between credibility and competitiveness, however, was not always
the main trade-off in exchange rate policy.  The study on Argentina, for example,12
illustrates a process of change of the relevant trade-off over time, in which the exchange
rate policy evolved from being mostly a  distributional issue during the height of the
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) experiences, to an issue dominated by
conflicting concerns about macroeconomic stability and competitiveness. In the closed-
economy ISI period, spells of appreciated real exchange rates were associated primarily
with the goal of keeping intermediate inputs, food, and capital goods cheap.  Given the
heavily protected domestic market, the impact of the appreciated peso on local finished
goods producers was essentially irrelevant. Although sometimes related to balance of
payments constraints, devaluations were primarily associated with distributional conflict,
and specifically with real wage reductions.  The authors find, in fact, that before 1978
(when liberalization began)  devaluations reduced real wages substantially.  As the
economy was liberalized over the course of the 1980s, the competitiveness-credibility
trade-off emerged more strongly.  Most particularly, the link between devaluations and
inflation became much more direct, so that those concerned about inflation focused on
the value of a real appreciation as an anti-inflationary tool.  The Argentine study provides
evidence, then, of a significant change in the very character of exchange rate politics as
economies become more open, and as inflation becomes a more politically salient issue.
Economic Structure
The country studies are not well suited to assess the impact of economic structure on
exchange rate policy.  They are not comparative, and in fact the five countries studied are
relatively similar in structure: all are of medium to large size by Latin American
standards, all have large manufacturing and primary exporting sectors, and all went
through long periods of import substitution followed by substantial trade liberalizations.
The principal comparative evidence is in the cross-national study.  A strong result from
this study is that a high degree of economic openness is in fact associated with a greater
likelihood of a fixed rate.  Although the result is due in part to the tendency of the very
open economies in and around the Caribbean basin to fix their exchange rates, it is robust
to the exclusion of these countries. Another piece of comparative evidence on economic
structure in the cross-national study refers to national sensitivity to terms of trade shocks,13
which would seem likely to be associated with a greater likelihood of floating.
Surprisingly, the opposite relationship obtains: countries whose terms of trade are
particularly variable are in fact less likely to float their currencies.  This is a puzzle not
explained by the existing literature.
Macroeconomic Conditions
The country studies provide suggestive evidence about the impact of inflation on
exchange rate policy.  In all five, conditions of moderate inflation typically were
associated with exhange rate regimes with some degree of flexibility—backward-looking
crawling pegs, target zones, managed floats. In almost all instances, hyperinflation led to
the use of a fixed exchange rate to bring monetary conditions under control.  This pattern
appears to hold both across countries and over time.  Argentina and Chile attempted
exchange rate based stabilization programs in the late 1970s to deal with their high
inflation episodes; at the same time, countries with more moderate inflation, such as
Colombia and Brazil, operated under crawling pegs.  But as Brazil and, again, Argentina
ratcheted into hyperinflation over the course of the 1980s, they turned to fixing the
exchange rate to bring inflation down—this time, with substantial success.  Chile, on the
other hand, having essentially ended hyperinflation and settled into a mild inflation,
moved back to a more flexible currency.
The correlation between moderate inflation and flexibility, and hyperinflation and
fixing, is quite strong.
9  This tends to support the expectations of a U-shaped relationship
mentioned above: regimes that allow some flexibility are more likely with moderate
inflation, while fixing is more likely with very low inflation or hyper-inflation.  This is
also in part borne out by the cross-national study: in particular, the statistical evidence is
                                                       
9 But not perfect.  Peru is a very interesting counter-example.  As Ghezzi and Pascó-Font (1998) make
clear, the Peruvian hyperinflation was defeated without the active use of a nominal exchange rate anchor.
They point out that this was probably out of necessity, as the country had essentially run out of reserves and
could not credibly commit to a fixed rate; and once the program was successful, there was little reason to
alter it.  In any case, Peru does not fit the pattern described here.14
strong that, in times of hyperinflation, countries tend to adopt fixed exchange rate
regimes.
Interest Groups
All the studies in this volume emphasize the role of interest groups in exchange rate
policy. However, the role of interest groups has evolved over time. The main reason for
the change in the impact of interest groups on exchange rate policy is the trend toward
trade liberalization in all the countries considered; in some cases financial liberalization
seems to have played an important role as well. During the import substitution period,
many specific tariffs and subsidies were in place, so tradables producers tended to focus
their demands on targeted measures that would affect their own profitability without
directly implicating the exchange rate. The existence of specific tariffs and subsidies
made it possible for governments to respond to the demands of interest groups without
affecting overall exchange rate policy, or to compensate those sectors otherwise hurt by
changes in exchange rate policy. Indeed, given the prohibitive protection afforded many
manufacturers, the level of the exchange rate was close to irrelevant—and an appreciated
currency could even be favorable, as it kept input prices low.  With the advent of trade
liberalization, as these specific measures began to be dismantled, the role of interest
groups as a determinant of exchange rate policy became more important.  And
manufacturers, no longer protected by trade barriers, had much stronger incentives to
push for a weaker real exchange rate.
The Colombian study illustrates changes over time in the role of interest groups in
exchange rate policy. The country’s coffee sector was subject to export taxes (in the
context of a stabilization fund) broadly related to international coffee prices, and to the
exchange rate. The relationship between prices paid to producers and the external price of
coffee thus determined an implicit exchange rate applicable only to coffee. According to
Jaramillo, Steiner and Salazar (1999), the sector was inclined to spend its lobbying efforts
on the domestic support price, rather than on the general level of the exchange rate,
which would have put them in conflict with other interest groups. In the 1990s, however,
the availability of compensatory mechanisms declined and, in the midst of a substantial
real appreciation, coffee growers became much more vocal about exchange rate policy.15
The manufacturing sector exhibited similar behavior: during the  ISI period the
industrialists’ association sought protection through subsidies and trade barriers, but
became very vocal on exchange rate policy issues as these specific measures were
dismantled in the 1990s.
The changing policy preferences of interest groups is tackled empirically in the
cross-national study, as well as in the Peru study. Both use dummy variables to indicate
periods of trade liberalization and explore how this affects the impact of the
manufacturing sector on exchange rate policy. In the cross-national study, a larger
manufacturing sector is associated with the adoption of pro-competitiveness regimes,
such as flexible regimes or backward looking crawling pegs.  However, these effects are
much smaller during the period of ISI compared to the period of liberalized trade. In the
case of Peru, Ghezzi and Pascó-Font find that during the ISI period a larger share of
manufacturing is actually associated with a more appreciated rate, and the adoption of
fixed or preannounced crawling peg regimes. During the liberalized period, however, the
effect of the manufacturing sector becomes significantly waeker. Therefore, although the
manufacturing share variable has opposite effects under ISI in the two studies, in both the
advent of trade liberalization affects the incentives of the manufacturing sector in the
same way.
Other sectoral variables included in the studies are the share of agriculture and
mining in GDP, as well as the share of exports over GDP. The presumption, in this last
case, is that as the share of exports becomes larger, the group within an economy which
would benefit from a depreciated exchange rate becomes larger and stronger, and would
presumably be in a better position to lobby in favor of exchange rate policies associated
with a pro-competitiveness stance. While mining and agriculture did not appear to have
significant effects on exchange rate policy in any of the studies in which they were
included, the share of exports in GDP appears to be associated with the adoption of more
flexible regimes (crawling pegs and bands, rather than fixed exchange rates) in Chile. In
fact, the statistical analysis in the Chilean study implies that a 10 percentage point
increase in exports as a share of GDP was associated with a reduction in the probability
of a fixed exchange rate regime that was always significant, and ranged between 1.7%
and 6%, depending on the specification of the model. On the other hand, the likelihood of16
adopting a crawling peg increased between 1.9% and 7% in response to a 10 percentage
point increase in export share, depending on the specification.
While the presumption in the previous paragraphs was that certain interest groups
would exert influence on policymakers, and their influence would be related to their share
in GDP, there are other channels through which interest-group considerations may have
an effect on exchange rate policy. Exchange rate policy can be used as compensation to
sectors that are hurt by other policies (such as trade liberalization). Perhaps more
common, given the relatively broad effects of the exchange rate, is for governments to
compensate specific sectors hit by exchange rate policy with countervailing measures.
There are several examples of these compensation mechanisms in the country studies.
The compensation issue is most fully developed in the Chilean case. In fact, the
issue of compensation policies involving exchange rates is a recurrent one in De
Gregorio’s paper—whether depreciated exchange rates were used to compensate
producers for the loss of protection, or whether subsidies were used to compensate dollar
debtors for exchange rate changes. Regarding the relationship between trade policy and
exchange rate policy, De Gregorio presents results suggesting that exchange rate regimes
tended to be more flexible (which in the case of Chile means crawling pegs and bands,
regimes associated with more depreciated real exchange rates) in times in which the
economy was more open, providing evidence in favor of the compensation hypothesis.
The empirical evidence in this case, complemented by quotes from policymakers that
illustrate the issue, leaves no doubt about the link between trade and exchange rate
policies in Chile. The Peru study suggests that the existence of export subsdies reduces
preassures for a depreciated exchange rate in a significant way, thus providing more
evidence regarding the importance of compensating mechanisms. More generally, the
link between trade and exchange rate policies underlies the policy mix observed in most
countries during the ISI period: appreciated exchange rates, which allowed for the import
of cheap intermediate and capital goods products, coupled with high degree of protection
for final goods.
The use of other policy measures to compensate for exchange rate policy changes
has been widespread in the countries studied, and has taken a variety of forms. In Chile,
after the exchange rate was floated in August 1982, a preferential exchange rate system17
was put in place, which was valid for payment of interest and principal of all existing
debts denominated in foreign currency. Brazil in 1979, and Argentina in 1981, introduced
variations of the same compensatory scheme following large devaluations. Other forms
of compensation included the access of large conglomerates to newly privatized assets, or
the introduction of special trade regimes such as that of the auto industry in Argentina
following the adoption of the country’s currency board.
Political Institutions
Several of the studies in this project investigate the role of the political regime in
exchange rate policy. The emphasis is different in different studies. While some studies
explore whether the behavior of exchange rate policies under democratic governments
differs from that under dictatorships, others look at the role of partisanship, the existence
of political competition, and divided government as potential determinants of exchange
rate policy.
Both the Brazilian study and the cross-national study explore the
democracy/dictatorship dimension. The cross-national study finds evidence that
dictatorships were associated with fixed exchange rate regimes. The regressions include a
time trend, so this result cannot simply be attributed to the coinciding trends toward more
flexibility and more democracy in Latin America. . In the case of Brazil, the hypothesis
that the authors work with is that democratic governments will have a stronger incentive
to cater to workers, who care about inflation and the purchasing power of their salaries,
as opposed to tradable producers, since workers are more numerous and define the
election results. Although dictators may at times need political support, as a general rule
they should have fewer incentives to respond to “popular” demands, and thus will be
more likely than democratic rulers to respond to concentrated interests such as those of
the tradable sector, which benefits from a depreciated exchange rate.
The evidence presented in the Brazil study, however, does not support this
hypothesis.  Bonomo and Terra (1999) use a  Markov switching empirical model to
characterize the behavior of the real exchange rate at any point in time as being in either
an “overvalued” or “undervalued” state. Then they compute the effect of the political
regime on the probability of remaining in each state, or switching from one state to the18
other. Contrary to the author’s priors, dictatorship increases the probability of a switch to
the overvalued state, and decreases the probability of a shift to the undervalued state,
which should be the one favored by tradable producers. Bonomo and Terra attribute this
unexpected result to the ISI pattern discussed above, in which highly protectionist trade
policies during the military regime allowed tradable producers to benefit from an
appreciated currency which would lower the price of capital goods and imported
intermediate inputs.
The Colombian study looks at two different political-institutional variables. First,
it finds that exchange rate policy has differed across political parties: the rate of nominal
depreciation has been significantly higher when the Conservative party—which has a
strong base of support in the coffee growing region—is in office. The difference is quite
large in economic terms: the rate of quarterly nominal depreciation is nearly 4 percentage
points higher under Conservative governments, although the partisan variable loses
significance once the authors control for real exchange rate misalignments. Second, it
finds effects of the National Front, a power-sharing agreement between the two main
parties, which lasted from 1958 through 1974 and significantly reduced the degree of
political competition. The authors observe that the National Front period is associated
with lower rates of devaluation, suggesting that the absence of political competition
reduced the incentives to pursue expansionary policies that might have compromised
economic stability.
Another variable related to the political regime, used in the cross-national study,
is the proportion of government-controlled seats in the legislature. The expectation is that
strong governments will be more prone to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes, they would
be in a better position to implement the macroeconomic adjustments needed to sustain
such regime. Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein indeed find that strong governments are more
likely to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes. The same is true for governments that face a
weak and fragmented opposition.19
Electoral Considerations
Most of the country studies, as well as the cross-national study, look at the effects of
elections on exchange rate policy. The evidence in both the country studies and the cross-
national study is generally consistent with the arguments outlined in the previous section.
The country study that tackles the electoral issue most carefully is that of Bonomo and
Terra on Brazil. Their Markov switching empirical model seems perfectly suited to gauge
the effect of elections on the pattern of exchange rates, as it distinguishes between an
“overvalued” and “undervalued” state and correlates these states with economic and
political trends.  They find that, in periods that lead to elections, the probability of
remaining in an overvalued state increases, as does the probability of switching from an
undervalued to an overvalued state.  Specifically, their results imply that, conditional on
being “undervalued,” the probability that the real exchange rate will switch to the
overvalued state is 17% during the run-up to elections in the democratic period, up from
just 2.2% during normal times. Likewise, the probability of switching from the
overvalued to the undervalued state increases from 10% to 19% during the period after
elections, although in this case the difference is not statistically significant.
The cross-national study by Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein also treats the effect of
elections on exchange rates extensively. Averaging more than 240 elections in Latin
America, the authors study the behavior of nominal and real exchange rates within a 19-
month window centered on these episodes.  They find that the rate of nominal
depreciation jumps upward two to four months after elections take place. The effects are
particularly strong after presidential elections: the average rate of monthly depreciation
jumps from around 2.5 % in normal times, to around 6 % in months 2 through 4.
10 The
real exchange rate, in turn, appreciates nearly 3.5 % in the months leading to presidential
elections, and depreciates on average 6 % during the following four months.
Interestingly, these results are even stronger when government changes are considered
instead of elections, suggesting that the adjustment in exchange rates tends to be delayed
until the new authorities take office.  Frieden,  Ghezzi, and Stein also show how the
probability of a large real depreciation (over 25 %) is affected by the electoral cycle. The
                                                       
10 Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein use geometric averages rather than arithmetic averages in order to lessen the
effects of outliers.20
probability falls from 3.84%, in the case of the whole sample, to 2.66% in the run-up to
an election (a reduction of over 40%), and jumps to 9.76% immediately after the new
government is inaugurated.
Other studies that look at the election issue are those on Peru, Colombia and
Argentina (Díaz-Bonilla and Schamis, 1999). In the case of Peru, the methodology used
is similar to that of the cross-national study, and the results are very similar as well.
These results have to be viewed with caution, however, since they are based on a small
number of elections. But the pattern of real exchange rate movements around elections is
very clear, showing a sharp appreciation before elections, followed by a sharp
depreciation once elections have taken place. The Colombian chapter compares the
devaluation rate in presidential election years (10 between 1958 and 1994) to that of non-
election years. It finds that in the months leading to an election, the behavior of the
nominal exchange rate is similar to that in the same months of a non-election year.  The
rate of devaluation seems to be lower between the election and the inauguration of the
new government, and higher after the new government takes office. These results,
however, do not appear to be very robust: the effect of elections on devaluation
disappears completely when other variables are included in the analysis.
Both Brazil and Argentina experienced several episodes that illustrate the
importance of the election effect. The Brazilian chapter discusses the 1986 Cruzado Plan
in Brazil, in which devaluation was delayed until one week after the elections, and the
1994 Real Plan, key to Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s come-from-behind victory in the
October 1994 elections. In Argentina, the authors stress the political impact of the Austral
Plan, based on a fixed exchange rate, for the 1985 Congressional elections, and the
desperate (and failed) attempt to control inflation with the Primavera Plan during the run-
up to the 1989 presidential elections. Furthermore, the Argentina study presents evidence
of the importance of the rate of inflation—which, the authors show, is very closely linked
to depreciation—as a determinant of the electoral result.
11
                                                       
11 Given the small sample of elections in this country, however, these results should be viewed with
caution.21
Conclusions
These studies provide strong evidence for the importance of the political economy in the
determination of exchange rate policies in Latin America. Much of the politics of
exchange rates revolves around the trade-off between the macroeconomic credibility that
a fixed rate can provide, and the price competitiveness of local producers that a flexible
rate can maintain.  Where concern about real appreciation dominates, such as in countries
with moderate inflation and little indexing, policymakers are more likely to maintain
adjustable exchange rate regimes.  Hyperinflation, however, makes fixing more likely,
both as concern about inflation rises and as economy-wide indexing reduces the
probability of a substantial real appreciation.  Where exports are particularly important,
currency policy tends toward flexibility, as exporters are particularly anxious to maintain
relative prices favorable to them.
Special interests also appear to affect currency policy, especially as the
manufacturing sector promotes more flexible currency regimes to maintain the
competitiveness of locally produced tradables. This is, not surprisingly, especially true in
relatively open economies; and in fact it seems that in the closed economies of the ISI
period this consideration was weaker or absent.  Stronger governments are, generally
speaking, more likely to choose and sustain fixed exchange rate regimes, as the
macroeconomic adjustments involved are typically difficult for governments with weak
political bases of support.  Elections, too, affect currency policy, especially inasmuch as a
real appreciation can deliver an electorally popular reduction in inflation and increase in
purchasing power.  In line with this, governments show a strong tendency to allow or
engineer a real appreciation in the run-up to elections, which is then reversed after the
government changes hands.
The studies reviewed, and others like them, indicate the centrality of political
economic considerations to the determination of exchange rate policy.  To be sure, the
current state of understanding of the political economy of exchange rates is rudimentary.
There is a great need for more rigorous and comprehensive theoretical and empirical
studies of the problem, both in Latin America and generally.  Nonetheless, on the basis of
the analysis and evidence presented here, it is clear the evolution of Latin American22
currency policies cannot be understood without a firm grasp of the underlying political
and political economy conditions in the countries of the region.23
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